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Roberta Dreon*
Dewey on Language: Elements for a Non-Dualistic Approach
Abstract: This paper reconstructs the merits of John Dewey’s conception of 
language by viewing it within the context of communication as the act of making 
something in common, as social and instrumental action. It shows that on the one 
hand this approach allows us to avoid the problems of the linguistic turn: the self-
entanglement of language, the overemphasizing of language at the expense of the 
plurality of our world experiences, and the unquestioned, but sterile, supremacy 
of interpretation. On the other hand, the paper supports the thesis that Dewey’s 
perspective on language does not produce a new form of foundationalism – according 
to which language itself is founded on experience, liable to be independently 
designated – by providing some arguments to interpret the relationship between 
language and experience in non-contrastive ways. In particular, the essay suggests 
a non-dualistic interpretation of the distinction between immediate qualitative 
experience and language, that is knowing in actu, by arguing that language cannot 
be reduced to the ordered discourse of inquiry since it also structurally includes 
qualitative and aesthetic aspects.
John Dewey’s conception of language is hardly one of the most studied aspects 
of his philosophical production. An important exception is represented by Max 
Black’s article, “Dewey’s Philosophy of Language”, published in 1962. The British 
philosopher criticizes some important points in Dewey’s approach: the fact that he did 
not have the patience to articulate the various details of linguistic cases – in particular 
by considering in how many different ways we can interpret the formula “taking the 
role of the other”, central to both Dewey’s own philosophy and Mead’s, in order to 
understand language as the act of making something in common; the fact that he 
traced no distinctions between the meaning of a word and that of a sentence; and, 
above all, the fact of not having been able to get rid of the ultimate residue of the 
traditional conception of language, that is of the “dogma of substantive meaning”, 
which still conceives meaning as the non-verbal counterpart of a symbol, liable to 
be independently designated1. Yet, despite these criticisms, Black highlighted how 
radically Dewey’s conception of language broke with the traditional framework, so 
efficaciously condensed by John Locke: language is not a mere clothing of thoughts, 
enabling the latter to be transferred from one mind to another (the mind being the 
proper place for naked thoughts); rather, it is a constitutive condition of culture and 
society. Furthermore, Black clearly stresses that according to Dewey language is a 
necessary condition for the individual mind and that it effects the transformation of 
the biological into the intellectual. Finally, he also emphasizes that a communicative 
approach to language implies a critique of the idea of private language.
What has probably proved most influential, however, for the relatively few later 
scholars focusing on the subject, are the opinions expressed by Rorty. While playing 
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a central role in the promotion of Dewey’s classical pragmatism, Rorty insisted on 
the primacy of language as opposed to that of experience, which he interpreted as a 
metaphysical residue in Dewey’s non-dualistic and undogmatic stance2. The result 
has been a debate between classical pragmatism (in particular as formulated by 
Dewey and James) and neopragmatism (especially in the Rortyian version), that is 
between the supporters of the alleged primacy of experience and the proponents of 
the centrality of language. Roughly speaking, a shift has taken place within this debate 
from a widespread position in favor of language, against experiential foundationalism, 
to a more recent trend to criticize the well-known thesis that “everything that can be 
understood is language”3.
But Are We Necessarily Obliged to Accept This Latest Form of Dualism 
Between Experience and Language?
Recently, in a yet unpublished text, Jean-Pierre Cometti has argued that Dewey’s 
proposals on language can be read as a linguistic turn the philosopher took before 
what is commonly regarded as the linguistic turn4. Indeed, the pages the American 
pragmatist devoted to language now seem very innovative for the years in which 
they were published (from 1925 to 1938)5. These writings reflect a choice to discuss 
linguistic phenomena in the context of social interactions, based on the idea that 
meanings must be understood from their use in shared forms of action, on a critique 
of mentalistic and solipsistic approaches to language, and on an attempt to interpret 
language against the background of a clearly anti-reductionist form of cultural 
naturalism, far removed from dualistic oppositions between socio-cultural aspects and 
natural ones. Above all, the French philosopher believes that Dewey’s conception of 
language enables us to avoid some of the risks in which the historic linguistic turn has 
incurred, that is the self-entanglement of language, the overemphasizing of language 
at the expense of the plurality of our world experiences, and the unquestioned, but 
sterile, supremacy of interpretation. 
2. Reference must be made here to the chapter “Dewey’s Metaphysics” in Rorty 1982, where the author 
highlights the tension especially resulting, in his own view, from Experience and Nature (LW: 1). 
According to Rorty, in this book Dewey aims to solve metaphysical problems and the unhelpful 
dualisms they create, but at the same time does not abandon the idea of providing a description of 
experience as such and of identifying the basic types of interaction, that is of achieving “die Sache 
selbst”, producing a new metaphysics. With regard to this point, I only wish to observe that Rorty does 
not pose the problem of whether it is possible to abstain from any sort of ontological assumption or 
whether this would be an improper claim to make. It should be noted, however, that when Rorty seeks 
to recover the pragmatist contribution on language, he turns to Peirce, as in Rorty, 1961: omissions 
are significant.
3. This famous thesis can of course be found in Gadamer 1960. On this debate, see Bernstein 1961, 
Hildebrand 2003a and 2003b, Hook 1977, Koopman 2007, Midtgarden 2008, Shusterman 1999.
4. The text I am referring to is the first draft of a new book entitled Le naturalisme pragmatiste. 
Expérience, langage et action social. I am very grateful to Jean-Pierre Cometti for allowing me to read 
his pages before their publication.
5. To be more accurate, I should refer as far back as to 1922 and the article “Knowledge and Speech 
Reaction” (Dewey MW: 13), which bears witness to Dewey’s appreciation of Mead’s contribution to the 
subject, following the publication of “A Behaviouristic Account of the Significant Symbol” (Mead 1922).
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I share Cometti’s view that Dewey did not think of experience and language in 
dualistic terms. However, there are some points where his writing might raise certain 
difficulties – difficulties that, in my opinion, can nonetheless be solved, as I endeavor 
to show in this paper6.
Is Communication a Water Pipe?
I think that a good way to introduce the conception of language developed by the 
American pragmatist is offered by the notion of communication, which is consistently 
associated with language in his writing. This word has the disadvantage, but also the 
advantage, that it can be interpreted in multiple ways.
Certainly, Dewey’s approach to language is primarily social, deeply influencing 
as it does the structure of his inquiry, both in Logic. The Theory of Inquiry from 
1938, and in his previous book Experience and Nature, from 1925 7. According to the 
American philosopher, starting one’s inquiry, as is customary, from the assumption 
that meanings are logical entities, existing before the linguistic sphere in which they 
may find expression, and from the idea that meanings exist within our minds as 
autonomous and already given constructs prior to social interaction leads us to typical 
philosophical misunderstandings regarding the phenomena under discussion. One 
will commit the typical philosophical fallacy of considering the results of processes of 
interaction as something primary rather than as end products deriving precisely from 
these processes; secondly, one will commit the fallacy of reifying the different phases 
of these processes, by treating them as independent entities.
Within a theoretical framework of this kind language plays the role of a bridge 
or a mediator that outwardly conveys predetermined meanings, allowing them to be 
understood by other minds, which are in turn understood as independent entities, 
completely defined prior to social interaction. Here communication means the mere 
outside transmission of contents whose exhaustive definitions take place elsewhere, 
before they are made public – and in this perspective language ought to inertly convey 
thought, without intervening upon it, for otherwise it might distort the meaning of 
things.
From this point of view, the way in which language communicates is of marginal 
importance if compared to the definition of meanings in thought. Dewey clearly states 
in this regard that:
Language thus “expresses” thought [and “expresses” is put within quotation marks 
because Dewey believes that linguistic expression plays a much more relevant role] as 
a pipe conducts water, and with even less transforming function than is exhibited when 
a wine-press “expresses” the juice of grapes. The office of signs in creating reflection, 
6. Even Colin Koopman maintains that we must overcome the alleged alternative between experience 
and language, but he believes that it is necessary to find a third pragmatist way in addition to those 
of Dewey and Rorty, and that it should be possible to do so by thinking of language as simply one 
mode of experience among others, “not different from other forms of experience in any deep and 
philosophically instructive way” (Koopman 2007: 716).
7. LW 1, and LW 12.
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foresight and recollection is passed by. In consequence, the occurrence of ideas 
becomes a mysterious parallel addition to physical occurrences, with no community 
and no bridge from one to the other.8
Social Naturalism and Making Something in Common
For Dewey, who had embraced Darwin’s9 philosophical teaching, the departure 
point is that no species of organism can be thought of as independent from its 
interactions with the surrounding environment. In the case of human beings it is almost 
a truism to say that man’s environment is naturally social: this aspect applies to many 
forms of self-moving animal life. Well ahead of many important ethological studies, 
The Public and its Problems, from 1927, tells us that there is nothing distinctive in 
this, and that we should rather ask what makes human forms of association peculiar 
as compared to those of other animals10. Dewey’s answer in Experience and Nature, 
published two years earlier, is that our environment is social in a participative way: 
whereas hens, when hearing the sound of corn, display self-centered forms of behavior 
– for each hen is driven to satisfy its own hunger and association between them is 
simply the result of the same need – in the case of human behavior the pursuit of a 
goal is, willy-nilly, cooperative: I cannot but take into account what my interlocutor 
does and cannot avoid “taking the role of the other”. The action here is structurally 
shared or participatory, in the sense that in order to be accomplished it needs many 
individuals’ contributions. This is why communication is so important for the human 
species, because according to Dewey it literally means the “making of something 
common”11. This is an important aspect, which, inter alia, deeply distinguishes 
Dewey’s and Mead’s pragmatism from the traditional phenomenological setting of 
the philosophical problem of understanding others. In the typically human dimension 
of shared social action, which is possible in virtue of language, I do not have to 
empathetically project onto others some alleged experiences which would otherwise 
be only mine; on the contrary, it is the communicative, conversational structure of 
language that forces me to move away from myself, from my present utterance and 
my present action: for I am trying to imagine what my interlocutor is going to do, 
having to cope with his answer (whether by accepting or rejecting it), and having to 
consider what consequences will derive from his behavior and my reactions to it, in 
view of what we are talking about and doing together. My role and his prove mutually 
determining during our linguistic interchange and our common activity in view of a 
given end12.
Therefore, when Dewey argues that “language is the tool of tools”13, he is 
emphasizing the fact that it means acting with an aim in view. But Max Black rightly 
8. LW 1: 134
9. On this point see Dewey 2007.
10. LW 2, Chapter 1.
11. LW 12: 52.
12. For an attempt to verify whether in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology it is possible to find a non-
self-centred conception of empathy, see Dreon 2012.
13. LW 1: 134.
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points out that this formulation requires some clarification: for even a Lockean 
conception of language would allow us to present it as the greatest of all human 
instruments, as words would be seen to transmit essentially private thoughts from the 
speaker’s mind to those of the interlocutors. In this perspective language functions 
as a bridge between substantially solipsistic minds and exercises its role at its best to 
the extent that it manages to remain inert with respect to the transmitted contents, not 
altering them, but returning them intact to the mind of the speaking partner, as if they 
were born in it14. It is clear that Dewey means something very different from this: 
shared activity takes place in communicative and linguistic interchanges in particular, 
where social interactions “of companionship, mutual assistance, direction and 
concerted action in fighting, festivity and work”15 take place. From this point of view, 
language appears to be an active means for the coordination of common behavior, or, 
in other words, something constitutive of the social dimension of human behavior16.
As is well known, Dewey argues that the experience we have of our environment is 
primarily qualitative – precisely because we are structurally exposed to our environment, 
we feel it, rejoice or suffer for what it does to us and for what it means directly for 
us: danger, comfort, benefit or harm, prosperity or impoverishment17. Quoting Franz 
Boas’ thesis that “the two outer traits in which the distinction between the minds of 
animals and man finds expression are the existence of organized articulated speech in 
man and the use of utensils of varied application”18, the pragmatist philosopher argues 
that one of our most distinctive traits is our ability to reflect, or to defer the enjoyment 
or suffering of those things which are immediately within our reach, by considering 
them as a means in view of further purposes.
In this light, the instrumental function of communication and particularly of 
verbal language seems rather amazing. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry reminds us that 
artificial signs and their meanings are much more powerful than natural signs (or 
14. Black (1962: 507-508).
15. LW 1: 135.
16. With regard to this point, in Midtgarden 2008 an interesting answer may be found to Max 
Black’s objection, according to which Dewey was still in need of finding a non-verbal counterpart 
to language, liable to be independently designated, in social activity: language is “constitutive for 
modes of behavioural response distributed in a social group” and is understood as “social activity”. 
In other words, social activity cannot be represented as being alien to language and capable of being 
independently designated.
17. I believe that this point can find further support in Jean-Pierre Cometti’s interpretation, where he 
argues that Darwin’s influence on Dewey must be understood not only in an anti-essentialistic sense, 
but also in a profoundly anti-telelological one: no line of evolutionary development is foreshadowed or 
guaranteed by a principle remaining external to evolution; whatever occurs within it – including human 
development, language and the mental and conscious qualities of certain interactions – is merely 
contingent, or, if we prefer, gratuitous, not guaranteed a priori. This is also why our vulnerability to 
the environment is structurally significant and for this reason, as emphasized by Sidney Hook (now in 
his “Introduction” to LW 1), the American pragmatist. Dewey insists on pointing out that qualities are 
neither properties of the experienced objects nor of the Erlebnissen of supposed private experiencing 
subjects. On the contrary, they are qualities of the interactions taking place between organisms and 
their environment, because, for example, fear or joy certainly involve someone capable of feeling 
them, but find their justification in the environmental conditions determining them – so that if someone 
feels frightened without environmental support, we say that it is a hallucinatory phenomenon. 
18. LW 1: 133.
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symbols) and those significances they are capable of signaling. While smoke already 
implies a certain form of representation, because it requires an inference – if I see 
some smoke, then somewhere there must be a fire burning – the word “smoke” may 
refer to smoke regardless of its existence, even in only virtual contexts, because of 
its multiple relations with other signs, which lend words their adaptability to the most 
diverse communicative situations. From this point of view, communication as the act 
of making something in common develops as an ordered discourse, which in each 
case will refer a specific context of action.
Meanings and Practices: How Language and Experience Support Each Other
But what kind of relativism is this? In order to clarify this point, it will be useful 
to recall a revealing example Dewey provides in his Logic.
Long before Quine’s famous anecdote on the “gavagai/rabbit”, presented in his 
essay on ontological relativity, Dewey drew a similar anthropological example from 
the book The Meaning of Meaning, by Ogden and Richards. A visitor is dealing with 
a wild tribe and asks a group of five or six young natives the question “What is it?”, 
tapping his finger on a table. The answers he gets are very different: dodela, etada, 
bokali, elamba, meeza. One of the boys thought the visitor was asking the word 
for tapping with one’s finger, another thought that the stranger wished to know the 
material out of which the table was built, another still was referring to the hardness of 
the wood, and only one boy referred to the table19.
Even in this case, it is worth noting the differences between Dewey’s position and 
other kinds of approaches. Dewey was not thinking about the social use of language 
as in Ogden and Richards’s framework in order to find a solution to the problem of 
connecting the alleged three vertices of a triangular pattern – the word or symbol, 
the object or reference, and the meaning or thought – which are understood as three 
autonomous entities, already completely defined before they enter into a reciprocal 
relationship. In an analogous way, as noted by Midtgarden20, Dewey could not be 
satisfied by Morris’ proposal to integrate syntax and semantics, as developed by 
Carnap, with a pragmatics, because the problem remained of the presupposition of 
signs, viewed in isolation from what they mean and from the “behavioural event in 
which alone they are sign”21.
Besides, while Quine theorized the indeterminate status of radical translation many 
years later22, Dewey in his work quotes an analogous example not in order to deny 
the assumed perceptual anchoring of language, but in order to argue that a translation 
remains indeterminate if it cannot be referred to common practices or shared linguistic 
customs, geared towards certain purposes. Words are defined in the context of certain 
social actions or, to use a different language, within certain ways of living: a certain 
19. LW 12: 59.
20. Mitgarden 2008, recalling the exchange between Dewey and Arthur Bentley on Charles Morris (see 
Dewey and Bentley 1964).
21. Dewey and Bentley (1964: 282).
22. In Quine 1969.
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communicative context is required – both linguistic and practical – for words to mean 
what they mean. From this point of view, we might say that meaning consists in verbs, 
that is actions, more than in nouns referring to particular entities, regarded as being 
pre-existent to human linguistic and social activities. Indeed, “Meanings are rules for 
using and interpreting things; interpretation being always an imputation of potentiality 
for some consequences”23. If meanings are objective and non-private, it is because 
they are first of all “modes of natural interaction”24. Their presumed essence is not a 
mysterious logical or mental entity, but “the rule, comprehensive and persisting, the 
standardized habit, of social interaction”25.
Hence, if meanings are related to contexts of action, this kind of relativity does not 
at all make them arbitrary; on the contrary, it enables understanding.
Now, precisely the fact that language is relative to contexts of social action 
and language usage geared towards the attainment of certain shared goals is what 
allows Dewey to emphasize that language cannot be regarded as self-referential or 
self-centered, because it undoubtedly requires social action contexts in order to be 
meaningful and not be confined to sterile indeterminateness.
On the other hand, it must be noted that this relation between language and social 
action contexts, between words and practices, or between meanings and forms of life, 
is not interpreted in foundational terms. We could say that the distinguishing feature of 
human sociality – which in Dewey’s opinion consists in its shared structure – cannot 
exist apart from communication: language contributes to configuring our human way 
of life, but conversely it is precisely this way of life that makes language meaningful, 
according to a virtuous circle that is certainly non-foundational.
To ask whether shared human experience serves as the foundation of language 
or, on the contrary, whether it is language that represents the precondition for a 
distinctively human experience – a participatory one, not a deaf, almost autistic form 
of experience – is a question that does not lead anywhere, like the old, though not as 
noble, question of what came first, whether the chicken or the egg.
What is distinctive in man is that human experience and language support one 
another and that we can envisage experiences in which communication plays no part 
only as conditions quite foreign to humanity.
Language and the Role of Consciousness
Dewey’s suggestion has even more radical implications, his thesis being that 
“communication is a condition of consciousness”26. Indeed, if we were to think of 
our participative forms of interaction and our sharing of experience as the result of 
the relations between many autonomous individual consciousnesses, we would be 
forgetting our existential biological matrix:
23. LW 1: 147.
24. LW 1: 149.
25. LW 1: 149.
26. LW 1: 147.
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Whatever else organic life is or is not, it is a process of activity that involves an 
environment. It is a transaction extending beyond the spatial limits of the organism. 
An organism does not live in an environment; it lives by means of an environment.27
Living implies an exchange of energy involving both intra-organic and extra-
organic factors, including both aspects internal to our bodies and aspects of the 
environment we belong to, and through which we try to restore our energies. But 
the point is that in the case of humans the biological matrix is also a cultural matrix, 
because our environment is already socially structured well before our birth, so that 
each individual will depend for his whole life on a socially pre-configured environment, 
which will continue to exist even after the individual’s death. Furthermore, whereas 
environmental interactions are common to any form of life, human interactions are 
characterized by a degree of qualitative, emotive and logical complexity, by behavioral 
plasticity and elasticity28 in responding to one’s environment, and, last but not least, 
by the capacity to perceive these same interactions and their consequences – that is, by 
our possibility of becoming conscious of them in different ways and contexts. Dewey 
strictly avoids dealing with the mind and consciousness in substantive terms, in order 
to think of them as peculiar and emerging modalities of human interaction. However, 
I cannot dwell on this point, because it would lead us too far.
Here I am rather interested in noting how the primacy of a socially and culturally 
structured environment affects our conception of language as communication – shared 
doing – and its relationships with thought. In this perspective, the idea that thought 
arises in a separate consciousness, that it is made up of mental contents, and that 
it must then be outwardly transmitted in order to establish social relations, is quite 
misleading. If we adopt the above-quoted existential, biological and cultural matrices, 
inner soliloquy appears to be a possibility deriving from primarily social forms of 
communication. Therefore, anticipating Wittgenstein’s criticism of the idea of private 
language, and the fluid relations between language and thought which characterize 
the so-called linguistic turn, Dewey argues that “soliloquy is the product and reflex 
of converse with the others; social communication not an effect of soliloquy”29. 
Individual selves emerge from the part they play in shared social action, in taking 
part in communication understood as the act of making something in common. They 
are defined by the linguistic and practical behavior by means of which they respond 
to the situations they are continuously faced with. While Max Black was right in 
asking for a more detailed analysis of what it means from time to time to “take the 
part of the other”, it is clear that the pragmatist philosopher had a bigger target in 
view: he wished to do away with the assumption that consciousness pre-exists the 
cooperative dimension of conversation, in favor of the thesis – carrying important 
ethical consequences – that everyone’s part emerges during linguistic and practical 
intercourse, starting from the answers that each person is able to give to the others.
27. LW 12: 32.
28. On this aspect, see MW 14.
29. LW 1: 135.
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What About Immediate Experience? More Fuzzy Limits…
As previously noted, a certain degree of dualism seems to emerge here and there 
in Dewey’s writing – both in Experience and Nature and in Art as Experience – in 
the form of an opposition between qualitative immediate experience and language 
conceived as ordered discourse. This is most evident in Logic. The Theory of Inquiry.
Some sentences, such as the following paragraph, give quite a clear impression 
that the two terms are antithetical: 
But in every event there is something obdurate, self-sufficient, wholly immediate, neither 
a relation nor an element in a relational whole, but terminal and exclusive. Here, as in 
many other matters, materialists and idealists agree in an underlying metaphysics which 
ignores in behalf of relations and relational systems, those irreducible, infinitely plural, 
undefinable and indescribable qualities which a thing must have in order to be and to 
be capable of becoming the subject of relations and a theme of discourse. Immediacy of 
existence is ineffable. But there is nothing mystical about such ineffability; it expresses 
the fact that of direct existence it is futile to say anything to another. Discourse can 
but intimate connections which if followed out may lead one to have an existence. 
Things in their immediacy are unknown and unknowable, not because they are remote 
or behind some impenetrable veil of sensation or ideas, but because knowledge has no 
concern with them. For knowledge is a memorandum of conditions of their appearance, 
concerned that is with sequences, coexistences, relations. Immediate things may be 
pointed to by words, but not described or defined. Description when it occurs is but part 
of a circuitous method of pointing or denoting; index to a starting point and road which 
if taken may lead to a direct, ineffable presence. To the empirical thinker, immediate 
enjoyment and suffering are the conclusive exhibition and evidence that nature has its 
finalities as well as its relationships.30
It is possible to interpret this passage in a deflationary way, in an almost 
Wittgensteinian fashion.
Because of the structural dependence of our organism upon a naturally social 
environment, it follows that first of all this environment is perceived as looming over 
our lives, almost as a matter of survival – from the most basic needs to prosperity. 
From this point of view, things are first of all “aesthetic objects”, that is “immediately 
enjoyed or suffered things”31, in which our interactions find their consummation, and 
a given experience simply comes to an end, without deferring any further. This is the 
non-dogmatic meaning of the immediacy of certain experiences, of the fact that they 
are not instrumental towards anything else.
But when something does not work, we need to go reflexively back to those things 
which had a certain impact on us, we have to analyze the various aspects of a situation 
which has become problematic, because we do not know how to react or what to do; 
so we reflect and try to understand things, to find some orientation. But in fact, when 
things work and do not enter into crisis, there is no need to speak about them, to try to 
understand them: we simply enjoy or suffer them. As Dewey states, there is nothing 
30. LW 1: 74-75.
31. LW 1: 75-76.
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mystical about this: we simply do not always feel the need to say something and to 
reason about what happens.
No doubt, this kind of interpretation of the above quoted passage is plausible, but 
I will not deny the fact that there are other implications that need to be clarified.
On the one hand, we have to understand whether immediate qualitative experience 
is dogmatically conceived as a first neutral element and whether it is interpreted as 
not being subject to participation. On the other hand, we need to understand whether 
language is conceived in purely instrumental terms, or whether – in contrast to what 
Mark Johnson argues in his beautiful book The Meaning of the Body – “the need of 
an aesthetic of human meaning”32 can find satisfaction also in language itself. In other 
words, I believe that in order to solve this apparent antithesis we have to develop 
less rigid conceptions of language and experience, for which ample traces can indeed 
be found in Dewey’s writings. Otherwise there is the risk of proposing yet another 
pair of opposites – two monolithically defined concepts – that fail to account for the 
complexity of our experiencing the world and speaking about it, as well as for the 
mutual implications between these two aspects.
I will here briefly list some arguments in favor of a “continuist” conception of the 
close intertwining between qualitative experience and language33.
First of all, it must be noted that the conception of qualitative experience upheld 
by Dewey is a non-dogmatic one: he is not, anew, proposing the myth of the given. 
We are very far from any attempt to found language on any kind of metaphysical 
datum: no doubt, things and other persons are already given in our interactions, they 
impose themselves upon us with genuinely intrusive force and we are not acting to 
construct them. However, they are not neutral atomic data we assemble in order to 
build knowledge; this kind of experience, which is primary just because it is not based 
on a reflexive consideration in actu, reveals how certain situations or things already 
relate to me – and not in view of other situations, things, or individuals. 
We have to distinguish what makes the appeal to a given a myth or a dogma, 
because it is obvious that something is always already given when we utter a certain 
word – e.g. the natural and social environment in which we live, pre-existing social 
relations, the physical and physiological limits of our body – unless we are dealing with 
a radical idealist, of the sort often conjured up in order to have an easy argumentative 
target.
The point of the problem is, on the one hand, whether Dewey’s call for qualitative 
experience is an active and foundational – that is, whether such experience is envisaged 
as the strong core that lends language its epistemological and/or ontological foundation 
and should be regarded as being foreign or structurally unrelated to language itself; 
besides, on the other hand, whether Dewey’s qualitative experience is rather passive, 
a sort of inert and simple given, already determinate prior to any meaning we might 
later attribute. With regard to this latter aspect, it is clear that “immediate” experience 
is not less charged with meanings – meanings are acquired via interactions with the 
32. Johnson (2007: ix).
33. For a detailed discussion of these aspects, see Dreon (2007: Chapter 4).
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environment. Yet immediate experience primarily deals with qualitative meanings 
– or vital ones, we might say – rather than instrumental or cognitive ones. For the 
caveman as well as for the contemporary man – who are not ethereal, disembodied 
consciousnesses, autonomously established before their building of a bridge with 
the world, but rather organisms exposed to what happens around them – the natural 
and social environment is always felt first of all – though to different degrees – as 
threatening or favorable, as comfortable or stifling; and the reasons for this are not in 
the mind of the subject, but in the particular interactions the subject has from time to 
time with his/her own environment. The myth from which Dewey was here distancing 
himself is the claim that all of our experience may be reduced to cognition or at least 
that cognition itself should be taken as the eminent mode of experiencing34.
As regards the foundationalist charge, in 1939 Dewey continued to support the idea 
of “the derived relationship of discourse to primary experience”35. But this sentence 
refers to a particular, although crucial, mode of language, supporting inquiry, in the 
sense that it actually allows its articulation by means of its instrumental dimension, but 
does not exhaust our natural language in all its complexity of uses and enjoyments36. 
Besides, the contrast between having an experience and knowing is not a contrast 
between experience and language, but between perceiving a certain situation and 
having the chance to consider it analytically because it has entered into crisis and 
one does not know what to do. To state this point more explicitly, we might argue 
that experience and language regard both the contexts in which things are enjoyed, 
suffered or even habitually used, according to an established custom, and critical 
situations, in which we need to solve the crux of a given matter, which inquiry must 
not so much represent, as contribute to solve.
Moreover, the above difference does not concern knowledge in general; rather, it is 
a difference between feeling and inquiring, between feeling and reasoning understood 
as reflexive processes in actu and not as the results of previous inquiries, as we can 
read in Dewey’s Rejoinder from 1939 37. From this point of view, Dewey’s talk of 
qualitative experience as “primary” might be misleading, because in this perspective 
it does not come first, being based on the results of previous inquiries, conducted by 
ourselves or by others: qualitative experience is formed by the meanings which have 
34. From this point of view, it could be argued that this is a myth at least partially present also in Rorty. 
See David Hildebrand’s characterization of Rorty’s rejection of experience in favour of language as 
intellectualistic in Hildebrand 2003a. Moreover, in LW 12: 72 ff. the criticism levelled against the 
concept of sensory data is very clear. Here Dewey shows how the appeal to something given can 
become dogmatic when perception is restricted to sensory perception and sensory data are envisaged 
as the first elementary factors of knowledge, which are not further reducible. On the contrary, sensory 
data are discerned and assumed in view of certain hypotheses that make them relevant in order to find 
a solution to an indeterminate situation. In short, we should not forget that the analytical aspects of an 
inquiry are functional to the inquiry itself: they are its products, not its constitutive elements. 
35. Dewey (1939: 546).
36. On this aspect see Midtgarden 2008, showing how a non-circular account of the language of 
inquiry – we might say of instrumental, cognitive and oriented language – as something not liable to be 
independently designated must be indirect and involve the background of natural language, including 
both used and enjoyed language on one hand and inquiry-oriented language on the other. 
37. Dewey 1939.
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enriched or impoverished our interactions with the environment, which in turn can be 
enjoyed or suffered, perceived for what they do to us and not deferred to something 
other in the construction of an ordered discourse. 
Finally, in the chapter of Experience and Nature entitled “Nature, life and Body-
Mind”, it is clear that language plays a feedback role for human sensitivity; language 
does not replace feeling in humans, but it contributes to configuring a peculiarly 
human sensitivity, which is different from that of other self-moving organisms. 
Dewey speaks of the natural emergence of language from life, but also of its feedback 
on forms of associated life, based on radical changes, so that human interactions with 
the environment take on peculiar modes: in short, human experience would not be the 
same without language.
If even inanimate beings are not considered to be isolated entities, but rather ones 
connected to an environment, it is clear that we are speaking about rigid relations, 
while animality, even in its simplest forms, is characterized by sensitivity – that is, by 
a capacity to selectively perceive environmental stimuli that will be experienced by a 
certain part of the organism for its whole body. 
In this sort of history of the genesis of human sensibility from animal sensitivity, 
an important step is represented by the new modality acquired by the interactions 
of self-moving animals: only in these animals does sensitivity become feeling, 
because the temporal dimension of movement enables discrimination, deferment, 
the postponement of the consummation of an experience, and a differentiation of its 
phases into preparatory and final moments. Only human feeling is capable of “making 
sense”, that is of reaching conscious forms of discrimination – conscious of both 
qualitative-aesthetic meanings and instrumental ones. 
Feeling becomes sense in man by means of language, because it is in a 
communicative context that a vague feeling of the situation takes on a specific 
objective reference: it does not remain submerged in an indistinct whole, but emerges 
with a clearer outline and a broader possibility of articulation, even in view of further 
ends, by postponing actual enjoyments or sufferings. By way of example, Dewey 
mentions the distinction that may be drawn between experiencing a certain disturbing 
or disgusting situation and perceiving a foul odor or red blood. In order to be specified 
as disgust or as uneasiness, these feelings need to be “designated as signs”. In short:
The qualities of situations in which organisms and surrounding conditions interact, 
when discriminated, make sense. Sense is distinct from feeling, for it has a recognized 
reference; it is the qualitative characteristic of something, not just a submerged 
unidentified quality or tone.
But, Dewey continues, “sense is also different from signification”38: while the 
sense of something is a kind of “immanent meaning” that is immediately enjoyed or 
suffered, signification implies the use of a quality as a sign or index for something 
else, for a further, temporally deferred possibility of consummation. From this point 
of view, linguistic symbols provide elasticity and flexibility with regard to the contents 
38. LW 1: 200 (and preceding quotation as well).
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of experience, the possibility of postponement, anticipation, memory, and abstraction, 
not because they constitute an independent sphere compared to that of sensitivity, but 
because they operate in strict connection with it. To express the thesis in a Kantian 
style, the typical human dimension is constituted neither by transcendental aesthetics 
nor by logic, but by the so-called schematism where intellectual categories find 
themselves already sensitively configured and sensible data are given in an already 
oriented way.
 “Communion Actualized”
To these arguments it must be added that in many texts Dewey emphasizes the 
qualitative aspects of language, not just its instrumental ones: meanings and words are 
not only effective means for further ends, but are also marked by a qualitative depth 
that is immediately perceivable – in contexts ranging from everyday intimate or more 
formal conversations to literature and, I would add, political discourses.
On the other hand, as revealed by the very titles of two of Dewey’s papers, 
“Qualitative Thought” and “Affective Thought”, the philosopher also stresses the 
qualitative components of thought, by arguing that they play an important role in 
thinking, where theoretical questions must be understood as answers to the qualitative 
depth of immediate experience. Besides, the pragmatist philosopher supports the 
thesis that a certain emotion or a feeling will often work as a sort of guide for the 
selection processes implicit in thinking, while also checking whether the conceptual 
tools identified are effective means of responding to an indeterminate situation39.
This qualitative aspect of language allows us to appreciate another feature of 
communication, for which Dewey had found confirmation in Malinowski’s paper “The 
Meaning of Meaning”, in the volume edited by Ogden and Richards. Dewey had been 
deeply struck by this essay, which he had read just after completing his chapter “Nature, 
Communication and Meaning”, as recorded in a note from Experience and Nature.
Dewey appreciated the fact that the anthropologist also supported the thesis that 
meaning depends on the social use of language – “a word means to a native the proper 
use of the thing for which it stands”. Dewey recalls Malinowski’s attention for narrative 
and ceremonial speech, where storytelling contributes to creating or reinforcing 
emotional ties among participants. The anthropologist had therefore concluded that: 
“In every case, narrative speech is primarily a mode of social action rather than a 
mere reflection of thought”40. There are also many cases where language is used 
freely, without specific purposes, simply to support social relations. In conversations 
of this kind, where so much weight is carried by interjections, pauses, hesitations and 
tones (as Roman Jakobson was to stress by explicitly quoting Malinowski)41, the so-
called phatic function of language manifests itself even more clearly, as the ability to 
establish, maintain and strengthen (but also weaken) social ties.
39. LW 2 and LW 5.
40. LW 1: 160. Dewey is quoting Malinowski (1923: 475).
41. Jakobson 1963 – a famous essay devoted to language and poetry.
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This aspect reveals that language is not only communication in the sense of the 
act of making something in common – not just social practice and instrumentality 
– since it is also suffered or enjoyed mutuality, through one’s affirmative or painful 
participation in a community. In situations of this kind “speech has both the 
instrumental use of re-assurance and the consummatory good of enhanced sense of 
membership in a congenial whole”42. Both qualitative and instrumental aspects are 
blended together in such a way that it is not possible to determine exactly where the 
former end and the latter begin, or vice-versa.
One last side note to conclude. If this phatic function of language is prior in 
developmental terms to referential and instrumental uses of speech, as Malinowski 
and Jakobson have argued – and, I would add, as some recent anthropological research 
seems to suggest43 – then it would be worth further exploring from this perspective the 
thesis developed by the young Dewey in his review of Tracy’s article “The Language 
of Childhood”44. By disputing some results concerning the frequency of the different 
parts of speech in child language, Dewey put forth the idea that we should consider 
these first early phases of speech as characterized by a primarily holistic, syntactically 
indeterminate structure, from which more analytical distinctions between verbs, 
nouns, and so on will later develop.
To complement all this, one might argue that the reception of our interlocutors’ 
speech proceeds in an analogous fashion: starting from an overall and qualitatively 
oriented understanding, we switch to a more analytical form of understanding 
whenever necessary – whenever, that is, a certain habitual response is inadequate, but 
also when the stylization of speech (both in literature and in special cases in ordinary 
life) draws attention to it, forcing us to appreciate the importance of single aspects, 
in a constant switching between qualities and functions that resists sharp boundaries.
I shall conclude with this typically pragmatist plea to recognize that sharp 
boundaries are often artificial and can become dogmatic if they are envisaged as 
primary elements rather than as the final outcome of abstractive processes, which are 
justified to the extent they are assumed in view of a certain purpose45. I have argued 
that an approach of this sort can favor a non-dualistic interpretation of the connections 
between language and experience: something I regard as being completely in tune 
with Dewey’s cultural naturalism, despite certain textual ambiguities, which call for 
more nuanced interpretations.
42. LW 1: 160.
43. See Dissanayake 2003, and Falk 2009.
44. EW 4: 66-69.
45. A charge of anti-nominalism, in Peirce’s sense of the term, could perhaps be levelled against Rorty 
himself, who refers to the relationships between language and experience and the alleged primacy of 
the former or the latter. As the philosopher argues in Rorty 1961, pragmatism is not “a sort of muddle-
headed first approximation to logical positivism”, and according to Peirce a nominalist is someone 
who assumes that everything that is real is or may be reduced to things that have sharp boundaries. 
In contrast, among the irreducible so-called Thirds which Peirce claimed as truly existing forms of 
vagueness, Rorty includes intelligence, signs and meanings, intentions, rules, habits. I think that we 
should conveniently add to this list language and experience as well. 
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